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Asylum Request Policies: 
Argentina and the Netherlands
Blythe Austin
I. Introduction
Over the past year I have spent a total of ten months abroad, study-
ing for five months each in Argentina and the Netherlands. When I tell 
inquisitive people that this is how I chose to spend my junior year in 
college, they always respond with a perplexed look and some sort of 
exclamation. Generally the confusion I encounter boils down to one 
question: what on earth do those two places have in common?
On the face of it, the answer is very little. After living in each place, 
I can appreciate how many differences there are between these two 
countries. Argentina is a passionate, Catholic nation where cafes 
remain open into the early morning and even business meetings do 
not begin until an hour after the scheduled time. The Netherlands is a 
staunchly secular yet Calvinist place, in which stores close at 6:00 p.m. 
sharp and supervisors demand a full explanation when a subordinate 
is so much as two minutes late.
Even before I left the United States I knew that I would have a very 
different experience in each country. However, I also knew that by 
looking beyond the superficial differences in how each society func-
tions I would find that the two countries share a deeper commonality: 
both must cope with the challenges that result from globalization.
Globalization does not recognize national borders or cultural dis-
tinctions. Every country on earth faces new issues and challenges as 
a result of the fast speeds at which information and people can now 
move. In order to link my experiences in Argentina and the Nether-
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lands together, I decided to focus on this single theme of globalization 
that impacts both countries. In this way, I might be able to draw con-
nections between the two countries that would not be evident to the 
casual observer. This has allowed me to learn more about the universal 
impact of globalization and lets me apply the experiences of Argentina 
and the Netherlands to my studies of other countries.
With this aim in mind, I have focused on the phenomenon of asy-
lum application procedures in Argentina and the Netherlands. In gen-
eral, the movement of people across national borders has been a major 
feature of globalization as geographic barriers break down. I chose 
to focus on the refugee phenomenon because it epitomizes the fric-
tions and issues involved in immigration. Comparing all immigrants, 
refugees generally need the most help from their new country. Further, 
refugees are often the most unwelcome immigrant group because, by 
definition, a receptive country did not choose to have them come. 
Rather, refugees embody the ways in which a nation can no longer 
remain isolated from events in the outside world. A war in a faraway 
place can physically influence another nation by creating an influx of 
needy people. In addition, nations usually cannot choose their refugee 
policies autonomously but rather must work under the influence of 
neighboring countries and a strong international framework. Thus, the 
movement of refugees provides a concrete example of how globaliza-
tion impacts states and state policies.
The essay is divided into three sections. The first two sections will 
be case studies that explain how the topic of refugee admission is 
viewed in Argentina and the Netherlands, and how the governments 
of each country respond to asylum applications. My challenge in these 
sections is to capture the complex political responses to asylum appli-
cations in each place. To do this, I will focus on a change of refugee 
law that occurred in each country: in Argentina, the 2006 Refugee Law, 
and in the Netherlands, the Aliens Act of 2000. I will briefly (a) analyze 
the historical backdrop in order to gain some understanding of how 
refugees are perceived, (b) look at the shortcomings of each country’s 
previous refugee law, (c) explain how these laws were modified by 
creating new policies, and finally (d) analyze the strengths and weak-
nesses of each policy. By funneling so much information into a small 
space, I intend to emphasize how complex and difficult is the theme of 
refugee admittance. Liberal policies are inadequate; the state must also 
create a specific infrastructure to accommodate refugees. However, 
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this infrastructure must not prevent asylum applicants from integrat-
ing into the wider society.
In the last section I will provide more general thoughts on the paral-
lels between Argentina and the Netherlands and what one illuminates 
about the other.
II. Case Study: Argentina
This section examines refugee policy in Argentina. To do this, it will first 
look at the background of how refugees have been viewed throughout 
Argentine history. Subsequently, it will examine the 2006 change of ref-
ugee law by first analyzing the previous law’s shortcomings and then 
briefly describing how the new law seeks to improve on the old. As we 
will see, Argentina has a liberal view towards refugees because much 
of its national identity is based on being a nation of European immi-
grants. This perspective went through a crisis in the mid-20th century 
when the definition of a refugee changed to include non-Europeans. 
However, with the restoration of democracy in the 1980s, the govern-
ment sought to again become a safe haven for the oppressed, and thus 
wrote a liberal refugee law with the intention of giving asylum seekers 
many benefits while their applications were being processed. This law 
did not prove to be effective, however, because it lacked strong insti-
tutional support for refugees. In 2006, the government tried to redress 
this deficiency by creating a strong government office that specifically 
addresses the needs of refugees.
A. Background
When considering Argentina’s current stance on refugees, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that, like the United States, Argentina is almost 
entirely a country of immigrants. Nineteenth-century Argentine elites 
used immigration as a way to unify such a large country into a sin-
gle nation with a common history.1 The country’s 1853 Constitution 
explicitly refers to a right to immigrate, and the government adver-
tised heavily in Europe in order to attract newcomers. The underlying 
assumption of this enthusiasm was that these immigrants would come 
from Europe. A large part of Argentine national identity was based 
on being a European country, racially and culturally, and thus distinct 
from its South American neighbors.
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The impact of immigration on Argentine society in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries cannot be underestimated; in 1914, a full 30% 
of people in Argentina were born elsewhere.2 At the time, no refugee 
category existed in Argentine law or rhetoric. However, the dictatorial 
regimes and bloody wars that characterized Europe in the nineteenth 
century played a major role in causing such a large emigration to the 
Americas.3 Europeans who today would be considered refugees were 
accepted along with ordinary immigrants and provided with govern-
ment assistance so that they could establish themselves economically.
Argentina’s massive and steady intake of European immigrants 
stopped suddenly with the outbreak of World War I. While immigra-
tion rebounded slightly between the World Wars, the labor shortages 
in Europe after World War II ended the era of large European migra-
tion to Argentina. This damaged Argentine self-esteem because it dem-
onstrated the country’s increasing economic inferiority to Europe. The 
Argentine governments continued for several decades after World War 
II to feebly encourage European immigration. This effort proved futile 
except with regard to refugees. Europeans fleeing persecution, includ-
ing former Nazis, found a welcome home in Argentina.
Since World War II, Argentina’s policy toward refugees generally 
has been shaped by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, to which it became a party in the 1960s, with the predictable 
reservation that it would only accept refugees from Europe. These geo-
graphic restrictions loosened over time until 1984, when the country’s 
new democratic government declared that Argentina would take in 
refugees regardless of their country of origin. This change in refugee 
law mirrored the country’s movement towards accepting immigrants 
from surrounding South American nations, since most refugees com-
ing to Argentina in the 1980s were from within South America.
Since 1984, Argentina’s laws on immigration and asylum have been 
notably liberal. This is attributable to several factors. First, the nation 
has fully recognized that Europeans will tend not to migrate to Argen-
tina anymore, and so to receive immigrants it must open its borders 
to South American nations. Second, Argentina’s brutal dictatorship in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s had a very restrictive immigration policy 
with regard to South America, and so opening the country’s borders 
was viewed as part of democracy. Third, the number of people immi-
grating and taking refuge in Argentina has remained small: people 
born outside of Argentina steadily make up only 5% of the popula-
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tion.4 In 2003, there were only 2,300 refugees and asylum seekers in 
Argentina.5
B. Refugee Law Culminating in 2006 Law Change
1. The Previous Law
After Argentina determined it would accept refugees from all nations 
in 1985, it created a new governmental grouping, the Refugee Eli-
gibility Committee (CEPARE), which brought together people from 
different branches of government in order to review applications for 
asylum.
On the face of it, the CEPARE guidelines take a progressive posi-
tion toward immigrants. The committee was specifically instructed 
to follow the guidelines set out in the Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) was encouraged to participate in CEPARE’s 
deliberation process and give feedback on its performance. The Argen-
tine government’s explicit incorporation of international input on its 
national policies is notable even in today’s world, and in 1985 was 
highly unusual, demonstrating that Argentina intended to treat refu-
gees in a fair and humane manner.
Under the CEPARE program, asylum seekers received temporary 
legal documentation immediately after applying for asylum. This visa 
only lasted for three months, but could be renewed indefinitely until 
CEPARE reached a decision on the individual’s application. The docu-
mentation gave asylum seekers the right to work and to travel. If an 
asylum seeker’s application were accepted, he/she would receive a 
two-year visa and afterwards could apply for permanent residency.
2. Problems with CEPARE
While the Argentine government created the CEPARE asylum system 
with good intentions, in practice the policy created several problems 
that made the asylum seeker’s experience more difficult than it other-
wise could have been.
First, by creating a temporary visa system in which asylum seekers 
needed to renew their documents every three months, the govern-
ment prevented the applicants from being able to work. In interviews, 
asylum seekers often noted that, though they had work authorization 
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as part of their renewable three-month visas, no one would hire them 
because their visas lasted for such a short period of time. Employers 
did not want to risk hiring someone who could possibly be removed 
from the country after such a brief duration,6 even though the asylum 
seekers renewed their three-month visas for as long as the application 
process took, which could be up to three years.7 Further, the govern-
ment did not assist educated workers in obtaining documentation that 
proved their qualifications for skilled work. One study in the late 1990s 
found that 18% of asylum seekers had college degrees but had left the 
documents proving this in their countries of origin.8 Thus, the vast 
majority of asylum seekers could only hope to get jobs in the unskilled 
labor sector. In Argentina unemployment is generally high, so there is 
already an overabundance of people competing for such work. Asylum 
seekers were at a natural disadvantage because of their visa situation.
Second, CEPARE’s application procedure required refugees to inter-
act with multiple branches of government and figure out for them-
selves how to navigate the large public bureaucracy. As indicated 
earlier, CEPARE was not an independent government office; rather, 
it was a collection of various government offices working together to 
process asylum applications. It did not provide refugees with services 
but only reviewed their applications and periodically reported back to 
the government on how well the application process functioned. This 
meant that when asylum seekers needed governmental help, they had 
to figure out which government office to go to and then learn how that 
office functioned. This bureaucratic mess had a substantial impact on 
individuals’ lives. While studying in Argentina I interned at a nonprofit 
organization called The Argentine Commission for Refugees (CAREF), 
which paired law students with immigrants and refugees who needed 
help navigating the legal process. These people’s problems were gen-
erally basic. Often an asylum seeker would come to CAREF because 
he/she needed healthcare from the government. Asylum seekers were 
entitled to healthcare under the CEPARE system, but either the appli-
cants did not realize it or they had no idea how to go about applying 
for social services from the various government offices. The Argentine 
government is essentially a sprawling bureaucracy, and without a sin-
gle central office designated to help refugees, asylum seekers often did 
not receive the generous social services allocated to them by law.
Third, refugee law made no allowance for people who did not speak 
Spanish to receive special help. When CEPARE was created in 1985, 
the government made the assumption that most asylum seekers would 
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be coming to Argentina from other South American countries. This 
was based on historical evidence: from the 1960s until the early 1980s, 
much of South America was ruled by harsh military dictatorships. 
These countries created large numbers of refugees, so that when Argen-
tina decided to finally eliminate geographic restrictions on its refu-
gee admittance, it seemed obvious to the government that this would 
lead to people from surrounding, predominantly Spanish-speaking 
countries dominating the asylum system. Argentina’s new democratic 
government did not anticipate that much of South America would 
now be democratic as well, and thus would not produce refugees. Fur-
ther, after becoming a democracy Argentina began cooperating with 
its neighboring countries to open up state borders to free immigration. 
By the end of the 1990s, someone fleeing from Paraguay or another 
neighboring country did not need to apply for asylum in Argentina in 
order to work and receive public benefits; he/she could simply regis-
ter as an immigrant and immediately be able to work and live. Thus 
most asylum applicants came from Asia, Africa, and Peru, although 
Peruvian applications ceased when Argentina opened its border to 
immigration from all Southern Cone nations in 2002. By 2006, the vast 
majority of asylum applicants did not speak Spanish, but the govern-
ment did not provide asylum seekers help with translating documents 
or state-sponsored Spanish classes. Because most of the immigrants 
in Argentina come from the surrounding Spanish-speaking countries, 
asylum seekers and refugees stand out as the one group in the country 
that does not speak Spanish. This hinders their ability to find jobs, start 
businesses, and integrate into the larger society.
These three problems with the asylum application procedure 
stemmed from Argentina’s lack of a strong institutional framework to 
deal specifically with refugees. CEPARE could review applications and 
make policy recommendations to the government, but it could not pro-
vide asylum seekers with the help they needed to establish themselves 
in Argentine society. The government wanted to have a liberal and 
generous policy toward refugees, but the intent did not translate into a 
positive experience for individual asylum seekers.
3. 2006 Refugee Law
The Argentine government recognized that the asylum application 
procedure did not function adequately under CEPARE and so created 
a new refugee law in November 2006 that dissolved CEPARE and cre-
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ated the National Refugee Committee (CONARE), a new and unified 
office to work with asylum applicants. The government gave CONARE 
the power to help asylum applicants and refugees establish themselves 
in Argentina, hence creating a clear institutional framework to address 
the specific issues that refugees face.
Though the temporary visa system still exists in the CONARE 
system, the 2006 Refugee Law guarantees that applications will be 
processed in a timely manner. In addition, CONARE is charged with 
helping refugees and asylum seekers find work. This assistance is 
meant to counterbalance the natural disadvantage that refugees face 
in the workforce. CONARE also helps refugees and asylum seekers 
access social services, including education. Further, it can create pro-
grams that address refugees’ specific needs, such as psychological ser-
vices and language classes.
Given the shortcomings of the CEPARE system, the 2006 Refugee 
Law is certainly a positive step in streamlining and strengthening the 
institutional support for refugees. However, it is not yet clear how 
effective CONARE will be in achieving its aims. The Argentine gov-
ernment has a legacy of passing generous, liberal laws that are not 
enforced or do not receive funding. In an e-mail exchange with my for-
mer boss at CAREF, I learned that refugees and asylum applicants are 
still seeking the organization’s help with navigating the governmental 
bureaucracy. Now that CONARE has the power to create programs to 
help refugees, it must receive the financial and professional support to 
do so. Also, it must continue to review asylum applications in a timely 
manner.
III. Case Study: The Netherlands
This section of the essay will consider the complex issues that sur-
round asylum policy in the Netherlands. The Netherlands receives far 
more asylum applications and refugees than Argentina. Consequently, 
this means that its asylum policy is more developed and that the issues 
surrounding this policy are more complex than in Argentina. As we 
will see, the Netherlands must create a policy for processing asylum 
seekers’ applications and addressing their needs that is both efficient 
and humane. The policy it had before 2000 was inefficient; the policy 
after 2000 does not emphasize human rights to the necessary degree.
Like the Argentina case study, this section is divided into several 
parts. First, it will provide a general background on how refugee pol-
Blythe Austin
9
icy has developed in the Netherlands and how the government has 
historically viewed its relationship with asylum seekers. Next, it will 
illustrate how the complex asylum procedure used in the 1990s could 
not function with the increasing number of applications. Then it will 
explain the 2000 Aliens Law’s new application procedure. Finally, it 
will analyze how the 2000 law has failed by sacrificing human rights for 
the sake of efficiency. This study will demonstrate that Dutch refugee 
law remains inadequate and that the state must continue to develop an 
effective application procedure.
A. Background
After World War II, the Netherlands sought to define itself as a tolerant, 
multicultural society in which diverse peoples could peacefully live 
side by side. The country became world famous for its liberal accep-
tance of immigrants. The admittance of and kind treatment towards 
asylum seekers was part of this ethic. The Netherlands ratified the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1956 and thereafter 
sought to have a refugee policy that complied with it and other inter-
national human rights agreements.
Despite that posture, the Netherlands did not have an established 
asylum procedure until 1977; before then, the government would 
periodically specify to the United Nations Refugee Agency certain 
countries from which it would allow refugees.9 Beginning in 1977, the 
Netherlands accepted asylum applications regardless of country of 
origin. It also created a centralized institutional system for processing 
applications and addressing asylum applicants’ needs. In 1987, the 
state took this centralization to a higher level by building three main 
reception facilities where applicants would live.10
Keeping asylum applicants together in special housing may sound 
extreme, but it reveals the holistic approach that the Netherlands has 
taken toward accepting asylum seekers. The state saw itself as respon-
sible for taking care of asylum seekers and addressing their special 
needs. Thus, it had to provide them with housing, which was most 
efficiently done by building housing specifically for asylum seekers. 
The government increasingly relied on these facilities to house appli-
cants for long periods of time. This practice was formalized by the 1994 
Aliens Act, which specified that asylum applicants would henceforth 
generally live in the asylum centers during their entire application 
procedure.11
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The belief that the state had to support asylum applicants inspired 
the creation of a strong institutional framework that dealt only with this 
group. In the words of one academic, the Netherlands has “gradually 
developed specific structures, parallel to general welfare assistance, for 
the admission and accommodation of asylum seekers: the competent 
authorities allocate them to a place of residence on arrival, provide 
them with accommodation, mostly in commercial centers,” and also 
provide food, clothing, and financial support during the application 
review process.12 In keeping with the belief that asylum seekers mer-
ited special treatment, they received different benefits than the rest of 
Dutch society. For instance, instead of unemployment benefits, asylum 
seekers received a state allowance.13 Such support is very expensive. 
In 2003, the Netherlands spent as much on its asylum seekers as the 
UNHCR did in its entire budget!14
B. Asylum Procedure Before and After the 2000 Aliens Act
1. The Previous Law
As the institutional structure for handling asylum seekers strength-
ened, the Netherlands developed a complex procedure for reviewing 
asylum applications. This system, codified in the 1994 Aliens Act, pro-
vided asylum applicants with many chances to receive refugee status 
and placed much of the burden of judging the validity of claims on the 
government.
When people declared that they wanted to apply for asylum in 
the Netherlands they were put into reception facilities where they 
would live while their applications were processed (unless other hous-
ing became available, which was unlikely). The application procedure 
could take years to complete; during this time, the applicants received 
special government benefits but were not allowed to work.
After a quick 24-hour review of an application to make sure the 
claim seemed valid, all asylum applicants had to complete paperwork 
and go through interviews before the government would rule on the 
credibility of their cases. This procedure was designed to give the asy-
lum seeker the opportunity to speak with an attorney and explain his/
her story to the authorities. The Dutch government then investigated 
the person’s claim in order to determine whether it had merit.
If an applicant’s claim were accepted, he/she would receive one 
of three types of refugee status, called the A, C, and F visas. Each of 
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these awarded the refugee access to different degrees of social services. 
Recipients of the F visa, which lasted for three years and provided no 
benefits, could apply to have their visa status changed to C, which 
allowed them to remain in the Netherlands and receive some benefits. 
Thus, an asylum seeker’s application was reviewed not just to judge 
whether the person had a viable claim to refugee status, but also to 
determine what type of visa should be conferred.15 Special visas also 
existed for unaccompanied minor children, whose unique situations 
were recognized during the application process.16 If an asylum seeker’s 
application was rejected, the person could appeal the decision. Appli-
cants generally remained in the reception centers during the lengthy 
appeal process.
The process to review applications was intended to provide asy-
lum applicants with government assistance and a fair opportunity to 
receive refugee status. However, in practice this system failed both the 
Dutch state and the asylum seekers because it could not handle the 
explosion in asylum requests that occurred in the 1990s: in 1987, 13,460 
people applied for asylum, while in 1998, there were 43,217 requests, a 
more than 300% increase.17
Several factors caused this enormous increase in asylum applications. 
First, in the 1990s European nations tended to adopt strict immigration 
laws, so that often people who wished to move to the Netherlands 
recognized that applying for asylum was their only option. Second, 
political strife in Eastern Europe substantially increased the number of 
European refugees. Third, and perhaps most importantly, in 1994 the 
Netherlands lost its natural barrier against asylum seekers when Ger-
many changed its own refugee laws. Prior to this, Germany received 
by far the most asylum requests in Europe because of its liberal asylum 
laws and long, largely open eastern border. However, in 1994 Ger-
many changed its asylum procedure to prevent people from traveling 
overland to Germany in order to apply for asylum, and also to limit 
the number of refugees it accepted. A chain reaction across Europe 
resulted, as people who before would have applied for asylum in Ger-
many now went to other countries instead.
As a result of the large increase in asylum requests in the Nether-
lands, the application process fell apart in the 1990s, as the backlog 
compelled people to wait in limbo for long periods while their appli-
cations were processed. The government provided for these people, 
but applicants were unable to make long-term plans for living in the 
Netherlands or to try to establish themselves as members of the soci-
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ety. In the late 1990s, an application took an average of four years to 
process.18
The Netherlands’ asylum procedure problems became visibly 
apparent in 1998 when the government, out of space in reception facili-
ties, resorted to housing some of the 43,000 asylum applicants in tents 
outside of the reception buildings. Because the application review sys-
tem was just as overloaded as the housing program, the people liv-
ing in tents had to wait until they moved into the buildings in order 
to begin the asylum application process. Thus, many who had come 
to the Netherlands to flee persecution now found themselves living 
outdoors and without any legal recourse for becoming legal residents. 
This situation proved to have more consequences than solely a human-
itarian crisis. Governments across Europe feared that those asylum 
seekers who had not yet applied for asylum in the Netherlands would 
seek to apply for refugee status in other countries while still living in 
the reception facility tents.19 This situation caused European states to 
begin discussing the development of a single EU refugee policy, but in 
addition to this eventuality, the Dutch government recognized that it 
needed a more immediate policy change to deal with asylum requests 
more quickly.
2. The Aliens Act 2000
The Aliens Act 2000 sought to dramatically cut the backlog of asy-
lum applications by creating a faster and more efficient application 
review process. Given this aim, the new law largely succeeded, in part 
because it brought the Netherlands’ policies more in line with those of 
its neighboring countries, including Germany.
Most asylum seekers now begin an accelerated application proce-
dure, which by law lasts only forty-eight business hours. People can-
not gain refugee status through this process; rather, this serves as a 
rigorous initial review that winnows out unacceptable applications. 
Approximately 60% of asylum applications are denied at this stage 
of review.20 The applicant is interviewed two times and is expected 
to make the argument for why he/she should receive refugee status. 
Lawyers cannot be present during the interviews, but the applicant 
can meet with a lawyer for a set time between the two interviews and 
with a different lawyer after the second interview. These lawyers are 
expected to explain the application procedure.21 Applicants must pres-
ent a clear and detailed history of how they were threatened in their 
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home countries, and provide accurate and thorough documentation to 
support their claims. They are also expected to have persuasive expla-
nations for any missing documents or using false documents in order 
to get into the Netherlands.
When an application is denied during the accelerated procedure, the 
applicant can appeal the decision to the general administrative Dutch 
court, called The Council of the State. However, during the appeal 
process applicants are not entitled to any public benefits or state sup-
port and are required to leave the Netherlands while their cases are 
reviewed. In addition, applicants cannot usually introduce new evi-
dence during the appeal process, so the information and documents 
given during the accelerated process constitute the seekers’ complete 
applications. The Council of the State’s decision is considered final and 
no further appeals are possible.
If an application is deemed admissible during the accelerated 
procedure, it is then more thoroughly reviewed, a process that can 
in some cases takes a year or more.22 The applicant lives in asylum 
facilities during this time and receives benefits from the government. 
Applicants cannot work until their applications are accepted and they 
receive visas.
People who have their applications rejected after the general review 
process can appeal through the same procedures as those who were 
rejected after the accelerated review. Once again, these people must 
leave the Netherlands while their cases are reviewed.
The refugee visa system was greatly simplified in the Aliens Act 
2000. Under the law, refugees either receive a permanent or a tempo-
rary visa and no special allowances are made for children. This helps 
to shorten the application review process.
3. Criticism of the Aliens Act
While the Aliens Act 2000’s guidelines have reduced the time asylum 
seekers must wait for their applications to be reviewed and have made 
the process clearer by reducing the types of visas granted, these out-
comes were achieved by curtailing the application review procedure 
and making the applicant largely responsible for the presentation of a 
well documented case. Many outside observers are highly critical of the 
law, and specifically the accelerated application procedure, contending 
that it allows viable claims to be rejected. This occurs in several ways. 
First, applicants often do not understand the accelerated application 
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process. Since it begins when they first apply for asylum, applicants 
have often just arrived in the Netherlands and are going through emo-
tional and culture shock. No lawyer meets with applicants before the 
first interview to explain that the initial interview will be critical for 
their application, or to tell the asylum seeker what sort of information 
to give the interviewer.
Second, the accelerated process does not take into account that asy-
lum applicants often need time to develop trusting relationships with 
an interviewer or lawyer before they feel comfortable relating why 
they left their home country. The accelerated process, which by law can 
take only forty-eight working hours, prevents such trust from develop-
ing because the applicant will generally meet with two interviewers 
and two attorneys during this time.23
Third, applicants are expected to know what information and docu-
mentation to give to the interviewer in order to make a credible case 
for asylum. Interviewers are instructed not to ask leading questions. 
Instead, they let the asylum speaker talk and then listen for any incon-
sistencies in the story. Such expectations are unrealistic; people truly 
fleeing persecution will not have been trained in how to present them-
selves effectively in asylum interviews.24
Fourth, the Aliens Act specifically puts the burden of explaining 
any missing documentation or use of false documents on the asy-
lum seeker. In practice, interviewers only accept strong explanations, 
despite the fact that the Netherlands’ strict immigration laws mean 
most asylum seekers must use false documents in order to travel to the 
country.25
Fifth, the 2000 Aliens Act eliminated special visas for unaccompanied 
minors. Often these children must go through the same application 
process as adults, including the accelerated review with interviews. 
When they cannot provide specific information, their applications are 
often rejected and the children face deportation.26
Thus, the accelerated application review procedure does not protect 
asylum seekers’ human rights because it overlooks their special needs. 
Furthermore, these problems have a lasting impact. For instance, appli-
cants cannot introduce new information during the appeal process 
except in very limited circumstances. This means that a flustered or 
ignorant asylum seeker who accidentally omits an important detail 
from his/her story cannot introduce this factor later on as evidence to 
justify refugee status. The accelerated application procedure is efficient 
at getting through large numbers of applications quickly, but it seems 
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to have been written without taking into account the trauma under-
gone by many applicants.
III. Conclusions: 
The Inadequacies of Asylum Application Procedures
After researching Argentina’s and the Netherlands’ asylum application 
procedures in depth, I am struck by their overarching similarity. Each 
country’s policy prevents asylum seekers from integrating into the 
wider society. However, the policies prevent integration in opposite 
ways.
In Argentina, asylum seekers are prevented from integrating because 
they have not received government assistance to enable them to do so. 
Argentina gives asylum seekers a great deal of freedom: applicants are 
free to work, travel, and receive social services as they choose. How-
ever, the government does not help them take advantage of these free-
doms. Asylum applicants must seek out Spanish classes, find work, 
and navigate the state bureaucracy largely on their own. This alienates 
the applicants because they do not have a foothold into the society 
around them. The 2006 Refugee Law may change this, but I am skepti-
cal. The Argentine government has a history of writing generous laws 
to provide social services and then limiting the laws’ effectiveness by 
not adequately funding them. Still, the creation of CONARE is a posi-
tive step.
In the Netherlands, the state purposefully chooses to keep asylum 
seekers separate from the rest of the society. Asylum seekers cannot 
work and generally must live in special housing. This institutionalized 
marginalization prevents asylum seekers from starting to develop new 
lives for themselves and makes them totally dependent on the state for 
support. The Aliens Act 2000 recognizes these conditions by attempt-
ing to clear out reception facilities and save government funds by 
rejecting applications more quickly. It does not, however, address the 
reason why the asylum application process is such a costly and com-
plex process for the state: the state must fully support asylum seekers 
because they are prohibited from supporting themselves.
Seyla Benhabib argues that a state can make policies to encourage 
the integration of a diverse population:
The law provides the framework within which the work of culture and 
politics go on. The laws, as the ancients knew, are the walls of the city, 
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but the art and passions of politics occur within those walls…and very 
often politics leads to the breaking-down of these barriers or at least 
assuring their permeability.27
Argentina and the Netherlands could encourage the integration of 
asylum seekers through policy initiatives. Both countries would benefit 
from government policies that allow asylum seekers to integrate into 
the society sooner. In Argentina, government assistance in language 
instruction and job hunting would prevent a permanently impover-
ished class of refugees from forming. In the Netherlands, the state 
would save money if it allowed asylum seekers to have more freedom. 
The Argentine government has recognized the benefits of enhanced 
freedom and reacted by writing the 2006 Refugee Law. In contrast, in 
the Netherlands, the Aliens Act 2000 maintained applicants’ depen-
dency and actually made their lives much more difficult by placing 
unreasonable expectations upon them. •
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